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ESSAY
RELIEVING (MOST OF) THE TENSION: A
REVIEW ESSAY OF SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS,
LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT'
Nicole Buonocore Porter*
This Review Essay reveals the considerable contribution made by
Professor Samuel Bagenstos in his book, Law and the Contradictions of
the Disability Rights Movement, where he acknowledges and tackles
most of the contradictions and tensions within the disability law field.
Instead of repeating familiar arguments about a backlash against the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Bagenstos recognizes and explains that much of the lack of success of the ADA can be attributed to
tensions in the goals and projects of the disability rights movement. He
makes a very convincing argument that the anti-discriminationand accommodation model of the ADA, while worthwhile and therefore worth
preserving and reinforcing, has limitations that cannot be overcome simply by amending the ADA. Instead, Bagenstos argues that we need to
explore social welfare interventions and we need to tailorthem in such a
way as to avoid "unnecessary paternalism and dependence."
While Bagenstos does an admirablejob exploring and suggesting
solutions to most of the tensions in the disability law area, the one that
he does not explore is a conflict that I believe will be pivotal as courts
begin deciding cases after the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Because
the Amendments have made it easierfor individuals to pass the threshold
issue of coverage, more courts will be forced to analyze the underdeveloped reasonable accommodation provision in the ADA. Many of these
cases will involve the tension that arises when the accommodation
needed by an individual with a disability conflicts with the rights or interests of other employees in the workplace. This Review Essay will discuss this conflict, exploring a resolution that draws support from the
lessons learned in Bagenstos's book, while infusing the discussion with a
communitarian influence.
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INTRODUCTION
As Professor Samuel Bagenstos states in his book, Law and the

Contradictionsof the Disability Rights Movement, "[i]n many respects,
the disability rights movement has been a remarkably successful social

movement ... so much so that the United States is the envy of disability

rights activists around the world." 2 Yet, despite these successes, many
scholars, including Bagenstos, agree that the Americans with Disabilities
Act 3 (ADA) has not lived up to its full potential. Rather than the common argument that amending the ADA will solve all of its problems,
Bagenstos argues that attacking the "deep-rooted structural obstacles to
disability equality" will require "confronting the tensions within disabil2 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 11.

3 42 U.S.C.

§§

12101-12213 (2006).
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ity rights thinking and coming to terms with the limits inherent in the
anti-discrimination and accommodation paradigm."4 That is exactly
what he accomplishes in this book.
In this timely and very good book, Bagenstos explores all of the
tensions and contradictions of the disability rights movement and the primary legislation that the movement helped produce-the ADA. Many
scholars have touched on these tensions, but this is the first effort I have
seen that thoroughly confronts all of the contradictions and tensions in an
attempt to explain where the disability rights movement has been, where
it is now, and where it can and should go in the future. This book has
honest responses to some of the tough conflicts in the area of disability
law and theory. Whether the reader is a lawyer, a law professor, a legislator, a disability rights advocate, or a person with a disability, this book
speaks to many interests and does so in accessible prose.
Despite his commendable job exploring and tackling the many contradictions, however, the one conflict that Bagenstos does not discuss is
the one that I believe will become pivotal once courts begin deciding
new employment discrimination cases under the ADA Amendments
Act. 5 Because more plaintiffs will be able to pass the threshold coverage
issue of being defined as an individual with a disability,6 more courts
will be forced to analyze the underdeveloped reasonable accommodation
provision in the ADA. While I think there will be many issues that will
arise under the reasonable accommodation provision,7 the most difficult
(and in fact the only one the Supreme Court has found fit to decide)8 is
the conflict that occurs when the accommodation needed by an individual with a disability conflicts with the rights or interests of other employees in the workplace. Accordingly, this Review Essay will discuss this
tension and will use some of the lessons learned from Bagenstos's book
4 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 11.

5 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub L. No. 110-35, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the Amendments, see,
for example, Reagan S. Bissonnette, Reasonably Accommodating Nonmitigating Plaintiffs After the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 B.C. L. REV. 859 (2009); Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin

Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187
(2008); Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with DisabilitiesAct:
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217 (2008)
[hereinafter Long, Introducing];Susan L. Smith, ADA Amendments Broaden Scope of the Law,
11 No. 3 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 63 (2009).

6 See Feldblum et al., supra note 5, at 216 (noting that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence-which has been largely overruled by the Amendments-caused courts to focus on the
threshold issue of whether an individual is disabled rather than whether the employer has
discriminated against the plaintiff).
7 See Long, Introducing, supra note 5, at 228-29 (noting that there are a "host of reasonable accommodation issues" that will have to be decided by the courts).
8 See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Huber v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc denied, 493 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir.
2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 742 (2007), cert. dismissed, 128 S. Ct. 1116 (2008).
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to help illuminate and guide the resolution of this issue. Specifically, I
will argue that the independence goal of the disability rights movement
supports my effort to accommodate individuals with disabilities even
when the accommodation places burdens on co-workers. I will also draw
parallels between the communitarian's emphasis on working together to
reach common goals and Bagenstos's universal approach to disability
reform. I will explain how this parallel supports my proposal to relieve
the tension between individuals with disabilities and their non-disabled
co-workers by accommodating the employee with the disability even
when that accommodation places some burdens on co-workers.
In Part I of this Review Essay, I will discuss Chapters 1-4 of
Bagenstos's book, which lay the groundwork for describing the history
of the disability rights movement and explaining the many conflicts of
the movement that Bagenstos believes contributed to the Supreme
Court's constrained decisions in the disability law area. Part II will discuss how the contradictions of the disability rights movement have
unique implications in the safety area (Chapter 5) and the life and death
decisions surrounding the disability community (Chapter 6). Part III will
explain Bagenstos's thesis that the limits of the anti-discrimination
model is responsible for the unreached potential of the ADA and will
present his solutions for helping the disability rights movement move
forward towards reaching its goals. In all of my discussion of Bagen-

stos's book, I offer my thoughts and opinions where applicable. In Part
IV, I explore my thesis-the tension that is left unrelieved in this bookthe conflict between individuals with disabilities in the workplace and
their non-disabled co-workers. Part IV is followed by a conclusion.

I.
A.

CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND HOW
THEY AFFECT DISABILITY LAW

Chapter 1: Introduction

In the introduction of his book, Bagenstos highlights the hopeful
promise and lackluster progress of the ADA. 9 Although many believed
that passage of the ADA was a "major victory" that allowed individuals
with disabilities to be "equal citizens," things have not worked out as
advocates had hoped.' 0 ADA plaintiffs lose an astounding number of
cases and employment rates are "stagnant at best."" While many have
attributed this bleak picture to a "backlash"' 2 against the ADA, and have
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
10 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 1.

11 Id. at 1.
12 For a discussion of the backlash argument, see Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the
ADA, and the Civil Rights Model of Disability, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABiLrrY RIGHTS 62 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003).
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sought to "fix" the ADA through the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
Bagenstos believes that the amendments are no "magic solution" and that
the problems with the ADA "reflect contradictions and tensions within
the ideas of the disability rights movement itself."13 Bagenstos claims
that one goal of his book is to draw out the complexities of the disability
rights movement to show that a "richer picture" requires abandonment of
the traditional backlash argument.14
Bagenstos describes the three major themes in his book as "the pluralism of the disability rights movement; the contestable nature of what
is a 'disability' . . . and the narrowness of the reasonable accommodation

requirement."' 5
In discussing the pluralism of the disability rights movement,
Bagenstos highlights the different types of disabilities and the varying
agendas of those who experience those disabilities.1 6 Because of these
differences, individuals with disabilities disagree on many issues, including, for example, what opposing paternalism might look like or whether
integration of individuals with disabilities is a proper goal.1 7 Although
the ADA passed by an overwhelming majority, with broad support from
both parties, it became clear that supporters had different agendas-liberal supporters focused on the civil rights aspect and conservatives focused on the ADA as a tool to allow individuals with disabilities to
become independent. 18 Bagenstos believes that some (but not all) of the
Court's restrictive cases are the result of a choice among a set of principles, "each of which has a solid disability rights pedigree."' 9 He also
highlights the conflicting perceptions of the reasonable accommodation
mandate in the ADA. 20 While some see the reasonable accommodation
provision as necessary for addressing the structural barriers that keep individuals with disabilities out of the workforce, others are concerned that
reasonable accommodations look too much like charity or social welfare,
2
sending the message that individuals with disabilities should be pitied. 1
Accordingly, Bagenstos summarizes a very important dilemma-the
need for independence from interventions that send a message of pity
conflicts with the need for those same interventions to dismantle structures that operate to discriminate against individuals with disabilities. 22
13 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 2.
14

Id.

15 Id. at 3.

16 Id. at 3-4.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 5.

19 Id. at 5.
20 Id.

Id.
22 Id. at 6.
21
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It is this last conflict that guides much of what Bagenstos suggests by
way of potential reform in Chapter 8 of the book. 23
The next major theme Bagenstos discusses is the "contestable nature of disability." 24 As explained by Bagenstos, "disability" is not an
inherent trait but rather a condition that results from the interaction between the physical or mental impairment and the societal decisions that
make physical and social structures inaccessible to people with this condition. 25 This was not always how disability was defined. The old view
treated disability as an inherent personal characteristic that should be
fixed. 26 This view stigmatized individuals with disabilities and treated
them as something less than normal. 27 This definition viewed existing
social arrangements as neutral, yet disability advocates do not believe
they are neutral at all. 2 8 Instead, the medical condition and the environment cause a disability. 29
Lastly, Bagenstos discusses the "narrowness of the accommodation
requirement." 30 While disability rights advocates deemed the accommodation requirement very significant because of its ability to demand that
employers alter the way they structure jobs, others have argued that the
accommodation mandate imposes significant costs on employers, costs
that most "rational" employers would seek to avoid. 3 1 Bagenstos disagrees with this criticism, both because accommodations can be rational
and because other anti-discrimination laws limit some employer behavior
that might be deemed rational. 32 More importantly, however, Bagenstos
argues that the accommodation mandate in the ADA has not been read
very broadly, and that "courts have consistently assimilated [the accommodation] requirement very closely to traditional anti-discrimination
rules." 33
B.

Chapter 2: The Projects of the American Disability Rights
Movement

In Chapter 2, Bagenstos explores the intriguing and varied history
of the disability rights movement. 34 Because of the fractured nature of
23 See infra Part II.B.
24 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 6.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.

28 Id. at 7.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 8.
31 Id. at 9.
32 Id.
33 Id.

at 10.

34 Id. at 12.
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the movement, one cannot speak of the "goals" of the disability rights
movement; instead, there were many different projects.35
New Deal Projects treated disability as a condition that exempted
the person from the obligation of having to work and entitled them to
government relief.3 6 But disability rights groups thought this charity was
stigmatizing and they wanted to work-rather than receive charity. 3 7 In
the early 1970s, the independent living movement began, along with the
belief that individuals with disabilities should control the services they
receive. 38 If it can be said that there is one defining principle of the
disability rights movement, it is that each individual is different and
unique and that individuals with disabilities are in the best position to
decide what services they need.39
Amidst this varied history, the one consensus of the movement is
that "disability" should be defined according to a "social" model, rather
than a "medical" model. 40 The social model views disability as a condition that results from the interaction between a person's impairment and
the physical and social structures that are inaccessible. 4 1 Viewed this
way, the proper remedy is civil rights legislation to eliminate the attitudes and practices that exclude people. 42 This approach differed from
the medical model, which focused on medical treatment, charity, and
public assistance. 43 The critique of the medical model is that it sees disability as a personal tragedy-a terrible chance event that occurs at random to unfortunate people.44 This view is also problematic, according to
Bagenstos, because it stigmatizes people with disabilities, by defining
them as less than normal. 45 Most disability rights activists disagreed
with the medical model and embraced the view that difference is constructed by social relations. 46 Accordingly, advocates see environmental
35 Id.
36 Id. at 13.
37 Id.

38 Id. at 13-14.
39 Id. at 14-15.
40 Id. at 18.
4'1

Id.

42 Id.
43 Id.

44 See also Marcia H. Rioux & Fraser Valentine, Does Theory Matter? Exploring the
Nexus Between Disability,Human Rights, and Public Policy, in CRITICAL DISABILITY THEORY,
ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, POLICY AND LAW 47, 51 (Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin

eds., 2006) ("The pathology is that there is something wrong with the society that needs to be
fixed, rather than that there is something wrong with the individual that needs fixing.").
45 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 18.
46 See also RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 6 (7th ed. 2009)

(defining disability as an "imputation of difference from others; more particularly, imputation
of an undesirabledifference"). She states: "To the fact that a handicapped person differs from
the norm physically or mentally, people often add a value judgment that such a difference is a
big and very negative one." Id.
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barriers as a form of discrimination, representing a view that uses the
able-bodied as the norm and ignores all variations from that norm. 47 The
social model has dominated the disability rights movement, with most
activists insisting that "society as a whole has a responsibility to eliminate the social and physical structures that deny people with disabilities
access to opportunities." 4 8
I have always been troubled by a strict interpretation of the social
model of disability and a complete denouncement of the medical model
of disability. With some disabilities, it is hard to see it as anything but a
personal tragedy or a terrible chance event. Anytime someone is diagnosed with cancer or multiple sclerosis, or has a skiing accident that
leaves her paralyzed, the person is likely to see it as a "personal tragedy"
and a terrible chance event, and will want to seek medical treatment, to
make her body function as "normally" as is possible. I certainly agree
that many barriers for individuals with disabilities are caused by inaccessible social structures and that ending discrimination against individuals
with disabilities must include changing those inaccessible social structures. But a strict interpretation of the social model of disability assumes
that there are no physical limitations of the impairment-that the only
reason an impairment is disabling is because of inaccessible social structures. Yet, when someone cannot get out of bed to go the bathroom
without assistance, it is not inaccessible social structures that cause that
limitation; it is the paralysis or weakness of the legs (depending on the
impairment). I do not disagree that it is important for the disability rights
movement to focus on the discrimination of actors who fail to make
physical and social structures accessible, but I think advocates should be
more honest about the causes of disability. One is not only disabled by
the interaction with physical structures and discriminatory attitudes; one
is also disabled by one's own physical limitations, whether they are from
pain, numbness, tremor, etc.
Even though disability rights advocates agree on the social model of
disability, there is still much disagreement. One of the continuing debates is between the universal model and the minority group model. 49
The minority group model sees disability as being defined fairly narrowly and seeks remedies directed at that narrowly defined group.5 0 The
universal model sees the disability label as arbitrary and useless and
would instead pursue universal policies that recognize that the entire
population is at risk for disability and disease. 5 ' The remedies would not
47 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 19.
48 Id. at 20.
49 Id.

50 Id. at 21.
51 Id.
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be disability-specific but instead would require all places to be designed
and built according to a universal template, designedto embrace the largest variety of potential users. 5 2
According to Bagenstos, the biggest tension in the disability rights
movement is concerning independence. 53 Activists argue that "people
with disabilities do not want charity, pity, or government handouts; instead, they simply want the opportunity to live in the community and
work for a living." 54 Although everyone can agree on independence as
an ideal, the law (primarily the ADA) does pose significant requirements
that can look like charity.55 This "wariness about welfare" was promoted
by both the political left and right.5 6 While some viewed disability benefits as an objectionable form of welfare that gives something for nothing,
others criticized disability benefits because they are seen as a sign of
pity, creating stigma against those receiving the benefits. 5 7 Accordingly,
many activists focused on a "fundamental reorientation of disability policy toward a civil-rights-focused approach." 5 8 Redefining the nature of
independence was therefore necessary to reach this civil rights focus. 59
Nevertheless, there remains a tension between benefits that are
given to excuse individuals with disabilities from the obligation of working with benefits that allow individuals with disabilities to "test their
skills in the world and experience the dignity of risk." 6 0 Focusing on
independence allows activists to obtain support from mainstream political leaders and the broader public, by moving beyond the civil rights
frame, which had a good deal of opposition in the 1980s. 6 1 Activists
realized that the civil rights paradigm made it difficult to justify reasonable accommodations, which are believed to be more burdensome than the
obligation not to discriminate. 6 2 Accordingly, activists used the frame of
independence along with a de-emphasis on charity to achieve the endorsement of fiscal conservatives.6 3
Bagenstos explains how the independence focus was a very important step in actually creating the disability community. Prior to this time,
the disability movement was very fragmented based on types of disabilities, and this fragmentation diluted the strength of the movement. But
52

Id.

53 Id. at 22.
54 Id. at 22-23.
55 Id. at 23.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 24.
58 Id. at 25.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 26.
61 See id. at 27-28.

62 See id. at 28.
63 Id. at 29.
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the independence focus resonated with a great number of individuals
with very different disabilities.64 All individuals with disabilities seek to
make decisions about their own lives, along with the corresponding risks.
As Bagenstos notes, "[a]ll sought what they understood as self-reliance
rather than dependence on the state or charity." 65
Despite the success of the independence frame, there are still tensions, primarily because individuals with disabilities still rely on assistance from third parties-courts, employers, federal agencies, etc.-in
the form of reasonable accommodations and sometimes publicly-funded
personal assistance services. 66 Accordingly, "[t]o achieve the political
goal of securing passage of programs that promote 'independence,' disability rights activists may therefore ironically feed the view that charity
and welfare are the appropriate responses to disability." 6 7 In fact, it is
my sense that the public's perception of individuals with disabilities is
not consistent with the independence goal; instead, courts and the public
seem to believe that individuals with disabilities are trying to have it both
ways-being treated like everyone else and receiving special treatment at
the same time. I do not agree with this perception but I think the disability rights movement has to deal with it if we are to have any hope of
achieving widespread support for disability rights initiatives.
C.

Chapter 3: Defining Disability

In Chapter 3, Bagenstos challenges the attacks that have been made
on the Supreme Court's interpretations of "disability" under the ADA. 6 8
While he shares many of the criticisms of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, Bagenstos believes that the fault lies not just in the Supreme
Court's decision-making but in the shortcomings of some of the principles upon which the ADA was passed. 69
As Bagenstos aptly explains, disability law is different from other
civil rights law because it is based on the idea of a protected class. 70
Title VII, by contrast, protects individuals of all races, genders, ethnicities, and religions.7 1 Because disability is specifically defined in the statute, "an enormous portion of ADA litigation has focused on the threshold
64 Id. at 30.
65 Id. at 31.

66 Id. at 32. For instance, Michael Selmi argues that the ADA was mainly concerned
with "transferring social welfare responsibilities from the federal government to private employers." Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV.

701, 771 (2006).
67
68
69
70

BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 33.
Id. at 34-54.
Id. at 34-54.
Id. at 34.

7I 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
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question of whether the plaintiff is a member of the protected class rather
than on whether the defendant engaged in improper discrimination." 7 2
Bagenstos takes the reader through the five Supreme Court cases that
decided this threshold issue of what constitutes a disability. While the
Court in Bragdon v. Abbott73 seemed to embrace a broad interpretation
of the disability definition, that broad reading was quickly replaced by a
more restrictive interpretation in the next four cases74-Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc.,75 Murphy v. United Parcel Service,7 6 Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg,7 7 and Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams.7 8 Using
Toyota as the guidepost, Bagenstos explains that the Supreme Court believed it was the Court's job to use a restrictive definition of disability to
limit the number of people who would come under the ADA's
protection.79
80
Bagenstos criticizes the Court's holding in the Sutton trilogy,
which held that whether someone has a disability should be determined
by viewing the individual in the mitigated state, taking into account the
ameliorative effects of medication and other assistive devices. 8 ' This
holding has caused lower courts to conclude that many conditions that
Congress believed would be covered are not disabilities. 82 Bagenstos
notes that criticism was even sharper for the Court's interpretation of the
"regarded as" prong (or perceived disability prong, as he calls it).83 In
both Sutton and Murphy, the employers believed the plaintiffs' impairments disqualified them from their positions but because there was no
evidence that their employers perceived the plaintiffs as being precluded
from a broad class of jobs, their claims failed. 8 4 Critics believe that this
aspect of Sutton and Murphy confirms the trend in lower courts to limit
ADA protection to a small group of severely disadvantaged people-the
72 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 34; see also Feldblum et al., supra note 5, at 216 (ex-

plaining that the ADA jurisprudence prior to amendments Toyota focused on the coverage
issue rather than the causation question of whether the employer discriminated or not).
73 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
74 BAGENSTos, supra note 1, at 35.

75 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
76
77
78
79
80

527 U.S. 516 (1999).
527 U.S. 555 (1999).
534 U.S. 184 (2002).
BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 35.
Id. at 37-38. The Sutton trilogy includes the Sutton, Murphy, and Albertsons cases.

81 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999). For additional criticism of the Court's decision on the mitigating measures issue, see Feldblum et al., supra note

5, at 192-93.
82 See, e.g., Feldblum et al., supra note 5, at 202 (listing impairments that the courts have
found to not be disabilities but which Congress intended to be defined as such: cancer, epi-

lepsy, diabetes, hearing loss, multiple sclerosis, HIV infection, intellectual disabilities, and
others).
83 BAGENSTOS,
84

Id.

supra note 1, at 37.
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"truly disabled."85 Many argue that limiting protection in this way goes
against the core principles of the ADA and treats the statute like a disability benefits program that redistributes benefits to a disadvantaged
class, rather than like a civil rights law. 86
However, Bagenstos argues that the Supreme Court decisions are
consistent with some of the principles behind the disability rights movement in the 1970s and 1980s. 87 Specifically, as will be demonstrated
below, Bagenstos argues that the Supreme Court's decisions are consistent with both the independence focus and the minority group model.88 I
agree with Bagenstos's discussion below that the decisions can be read in
a way that is consistent with some of the goals of the disability rights
movement. But I am skeptical that the Supreme Court in 1999 and 2002
(when these controversial cases were decided) was influenced by the
motivations of the disability rights movement in the 1970s and 1980s.
Having said that, Bagenstos's explanation for the Court's decisions is
certainly intriguing and a welcome departure from the traditional backlash argument.
Bagenstos first argues that the Supreme Court's decisions are consistent with the independence focus of the disability rights movement. 89
If the ADA is understood as saving society money by allowing individuals with disabilities to move from welfare to work, then it makes sense to
provide the ADA's protections to those who are the "most" disabledthose who would otherwise be unable to work and would therefore be on
public assistance. 90 Cases that limit coverage to the "truly disabled" can
be read as drawing the line between those who could find work without
the ADA and those who would be on public assistance without the
ADA. 91 As Bagenstos states: "An 'independence' approach would treat
the ADA as a way of getting people out of benefits programs and into the
workforce, not as a way of getting job accommodations for people who
85 Id. at 37-38.

86 Id. at 38; see also Feldblum et al., supra note 5, at 217 (arguing that one reason courts
might limit the definition of disability is because they see the term "disability" as synonymous
with an inability to work, which necessarily suggests that individuals with disabilities are "significantly different than 'the rest of us"' (citation omitted)).
87 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 38.
88 Id. at 38-41.
89 Id. at 39.
90 Id. at 39; see also Feldblum et al., supra note 5, at 217. Feldblum believes that the
view of disability as being synonymous with "inability to work" might have been caused by
the fact that most disability cases are claims for disability payments under Social Security,
where the standard is whether the individual has a physical or mental impairment which makes
him or her unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity correctly points out that the
ADA is a civil rights law, not a disability payment law and that the goal of the ADA is to
prohibit discrimination against individuals because of their disability, even if they can work.
See id.
91 BAGENSTos, supra note 1, at 39.
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could be in the workplace anyway." 92 The point is, according to Bagenstos, that the Supreme Court's decisions do not necessarily demonstrate a
betrayal to the promises of the ADA but instead demonstrate the
problems with the emphasis on independence. 93
I agree with Bagenstos that the focus on independence explains the
Court's disability rights jurisprudence. But the thrust of the ADA is
clearly a civil rights law. As an analogy, it would never be an appropriate response to assert that as long as a racial minority can find work, it
does not matter that he cannot continue to work for the same employer.
While independence was a goal of some supporters of the ADA, the clear
emphasis of the statute is a civil rights law. 9 4 And because that conclusion is inescapable, I believe that the Court's opinions do represent a
betrayal of the civil rights goal of the ADA.
Bagenstos also argues that the Supreme Court's decisions are consistent with the minority group model, which seeks to define disability as
a discrete, stigmatized minority group. For instance, HIV is highly stig95
matized and the Court held it was a disability in Bragdon v. Abbott.
Fully correctable vision and high blood pressure controlled by medication (conditions the Supreme Court found to not be disabilities) are not
stigmatizing and are fairly common impairments. 9 6 Bagenstos also argues that the minority group model justifies the mitigating measures decision in Sutton because the ability to use mitigating measures will often
make a difference in how society responds to an impairment. 9 7 Bagenstos recognizes that some mitigating measures do not reduce the stigma

of an impairment and may, in fact, contribute to the stigmatization of the
impairment [think: hearing aid] but he does not believe that anything in
Sutton supports such an inference that these impairments should not be
covered. 9 8 Either these conditions should be covered because the mitigating measure causes significant limitations on the individual's major
life activities (such as the effects of antiepileptic drugs) or the impairments should be covered under the "regarded as" prong because significant segments of society view the conditions as stigmatizing. 99 I think
Bagenstos makes a good point that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is
consistent with the minority group model. Such a position finds support
92 Id. at 40.
93 Id. at 41.

94 See Feldblum et al., supra note 5, at 217 (stating that the ADA is a civil rights law and
therefore the goal of the ADA is to prohibit discrimination against a person because of the
person's disability).
95 524 U.S. 624, 655 (1998).
96 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 41 (referring to Sutton and Murphy).
97 Id. at 41-42.
98 Id. at 42-43.
99 Id. at 43.
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in the original ADA;'oo however, the Amendments to the ADA make
clear that this is too limited of a reading of the ADA. 10 1
In sum, Bagenstos argues that even though the Supreme Court's
decisions are not consistent with a universal view of disability, they are
consistent with the independence focus and the minority group model.10 2
Accordingly, "it is not fair to say that the Supreme Court's definition-ofdisability decisions disregarded the principles of the disability rights
movement. It is more accurate to say that those decisions took sides in a
dispute within the movement." 103 This does not mean that he agrees
with the decisions-he does not-instead, he argues that the shortcomings of the decisions are related to the limitations of the independence
focus and the minority group model.104
The limitations of the independence focus are obvious. Many individuals with disabilities may be able to hold down a job and therefore
will be considered "independent." But yet, these individuals suffer from
limitations that can limit their full range of opportunities.10 5 As Bagenstos notes:
"If the goal of disability rights law is to promote equal
opportunity to participate in the economic and civic life
of the community, the law must strike at those limitations, even if they do not compromise individual 'independence.' Mere 'independence,' without equality, is
not what disability rights activists really seek, and a statute constrained by a focus on independence is unduly
limited." 0 6
Bagenstos next argues that the minority group model is also too
narrow to be the basis for disability rights law. First, the minority group
model makes the ADA more vulnerable to political attack and stigmatizes the beneficiaries, which leads to judges vigorously policing the line
between the protected and the unprotected.

07

In fact, judges have

guarded the boundary vigorously, asserting the fear that if the ADA is
100 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006) (providing the finding of Congress that "individuals
with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority").
101 See id. (showing the Amendments deleted the reference to the "discrete and insular
minority").
102 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 44.
103 Id. at 45. While I agree that the decisions can be read in a way entirely consistent with
Bagenstos's argument, I disagree that the Supreme Court was cognizant of the fact that it was
"taking sides" in a debate-especially when the side of the debate it took is not the side of the
debate reflected in the statute Congress enacted.
104 Id. at 45.
105 Id. at 46.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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extended too broadly, it will harm the people who are truly in need.10 8
Bagenstos responds to this focus on the minority group model:
Even if one thinks that disability defines a discrete, subordinated group, then it does not make sense to target
disability law's protections to that group alone: the very
act of targeting triggers political and judicial pressures to
shrink the size of the protected class and to reduce the
protections afforded to that class. A targeted disability
law may ironically have exactly the opposite effect from
the one the lower courts predict: it may reduce the
chances that full protection will be provided to the full
intended protected class.10 9
I have found that law students in my disability classes tend to agree
with the Court's emphasis on the minority group model and attempts to
strictly limit the size of the protected class. Their concern seems to be
that if too many people are considered to have a disability, the employer
will have to provide accommodations to all of those people, missing the
obvious fact that many of those individuals (like the Sutton sisters)11 o
will not need an accommodation. The concern with having to provide
accommodations to too many people seems to be based on two separate
concerns, depending on the student's perspective. Either students think it
will be too expensive for employers or students assume that there is a
finite number of accommodations that can be given and providing accommodations to some minimally disabled individuals will preclude providing accommodations to the more severely disabled."'
Bagenstos argues that a more difficult problem is that the minority
group model misstates the nature of disability inequality. Disability inequality is not just discrimination against a stigmatized group.x 12 It also
consists of norms developed by those who design institutions without
taking into account the needs of people who differ, physically or mentally.1 13 Bagenstos points out how the courts' rulings demonstrate a re108 Id. at 47.
109 Id.

110 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999). The sisters in Sutton had
fully correctable myopia. Id. They would not need an accommodation. Id.
Il l See also Feldblum et al., supra note 5, at 228 (discussing the legislative process for the
ADA Amendments Act, where she (as a witness) responded to the fear of some that the
amended statute will undermine the cause of people with disabilities because the law will no
longer cover just the "truly disabled" by stating that people with disabilities want the amendments to pass and do not worry that the new statute will set back their cause because they
understand that there is no set of "truly disabled" people; instead, we all exist along a spectrum
of abilities).
112 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 47.
113 Id. at 48. For instance, using learning disabilities as an example, Bagenstos explains

how standardized testing has been developed with time constraints, not because of targeted
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luctance to allow protection to plaintiffs when their claims involve an
incompatibility with workplace norms and structures. 114 He also correctly notes that allowing plaintiffs to fall under ADA protection would
not automatically render the workplace norms invalid. It would simply
require the employer to justify the exclusionary norm or practice." 5
Bagenstos considers two possible solutions to the definition problem-the ADA Amendments Act and a broader definition of disability.
While he thinks the ADA Amendments Act is a "worthy effort that is
likely to make things somewhat better," he does not think it will get us
past the courts' urge to strictly interpret the statute.1 16 Even if the ADA
defined coverage to include everyone with an impairment-regardless of
whether it imposes a substantial limitation on a major life activitycourts would likely turn to interpreting "impairment" strictly to limit
coverage. 17 I have a more positive outlook about the Amendments, at
least with respect to finding individuals to be in the protected class. As
will be discussed later, I think courts' limiting interpretations of the ADA
will now be on the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA.' 18
Bagenstos also explores a broader definition of disability that is
used in Australia. There, the definition does not require a "substantial
limitation" on a major life activity; it includes possible future impairments, and it does not require the impairment to have an immediately
harmful effect on the body."' 9 While the broader definition is thought to
avoid the "anomaly" that an individual who has been rejected because of
his disability is determined to not be disabled enough for protection
under the statute, it has not proven extremely successful in Australia because victims remain reluctant to bring claims.1 20 Even if this type of
law was very successful, Bagenstos believes that it is highly unlikely
Congress would pass such an act in the United States because the minority group model and independence focus had so much appeal to liberals
and conservatives.121 I agree with his conclusion that a universalist approach would indeed be a radical change in the law and one that needs
extensive political work-not just a statutory change. 122
discrimination against those with learning disabilities, but because a norm that neglected to
consider the differences in those with learning disabilities. Id.
114 Id. at 48-49.
115 Id. at 49.
116 Id. at 51.
117 Id.
118 See infra Part IV.
119 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 52-53.
120 Id.

121 Id. at 53.
122 Id. at 54.
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Chapter 4: The Role of Accommodation in Disability
DiscriminationLaw

In Chapter 4, Bagenstos discusses the role of the accommodation
mandate-the "centerpiece" of disability discrimination laws. Because
accommodations require taking the protected class into account, rather
than ignoring the protected class status, critics of the ADA claim a
"strong normative distinction between the ADA's accommodation mandate and the anti-discrimination requirements of [other] civil rights
laws." 1 23 These critics believe that the ADA is a redistributive scheme
that is essentially a mandated benefits program for the disabled, rather
than a civil rights law. Bagenstos, however, makes a convincing argument that under the minority-group model, "anti-discrimination and accommodation are very closely aligned normatively." 12 4
Despite the obvious differences between anti-discrimination laws,
which demand entities treat people equally, and accommodation mandates, which demand entities take differences into account, Bagenstos
argues that they are more similar than different for a couple of reasons. 125 First, accommodation mandates often expose hidden conduct
that would be seen as discriminatory if it were out in the open. For
instance, many disability activists point out that employers accommodate
needs of non-disabled employees all the time and only protest when a
disabled worker needs an accommodation. 1 26 Furthermore, Bagenstos
argues that both anti-discrimination and accommodation mandates "target conduct that violates the duty to avoid contributing to a subordinating
system, at least where that can be accomplished at a reasonable cost."1 2 7
Seen this way, accommodation mandates are just an example of the general prohibition on rational discrimination. 128
Bagenstos agrees with other theorists who argue there are three reasons for prohibiting rational discrimination in the race-based context: (1)
the racial differences that make discrimination rational are caused by earlier irrational discrimination; (2) from the victim's perspective, the harmful result is the same, even if the reason is rational; 129 and (3) an
"employer who has the power to work against the underlying problem of
cumulative disadvantage, even if it involves sacrifice, bears some degree
of responsibility"-especially when holding the employer responsible is
123 Id.
124 Id.

at 55.
at 56.

125 Id.

126 Id. In my years of private practice representing employers, I observed this phenomenon all of the time.
127 Id. at 57.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 62.

778

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20:761

not likely to cause an unreasonable burden. 130 Accordingly, employers
have an obligation to refrain from rational discrimination because it perpetuates prior inequalities.
Viewing anti-discrimination as a way of tackling subordination,
Bagenstos argues that the link between anti-discrimination and accommodation is clear.' 3 ' Accommodation in the disability context merely
provides equal opportunity by dismantling the structure of subordination
of individuals with disabilities. 13 2 As Bagenstos convincingly argues,
accommodation requirements "simply restore a just distribution; they do
not redistribute." 3 3
Bagenstos then argues that the three justifications for imposing liability on employers for rational discrimination in other civil rights contexts (like race discrimination)-(1) rational discrimination may be
animus-based discrimination in disguise; (2) even non-animus-based rational discrimination may reflect selective sympathy and indifference;
and (3) rational discrimination represents an employer's continued maintenance of subordination-also apply to failure to accommodate

claims.13 4
First, many failure to accommodate claims can be seen as animusbased or at least involving selective sympathy and indifference because
employers make individualized accommodations to non-disabled employees all of the time. 135 Further, even if the accommodation is not
comparable to other accommodations requested or given, one can still
see a case of selective indifference by expanding the time frame to include a time at which physical or institutional structures were designed
without consideration of the needs of employees with disabilities. 1 3 6
Those needs were not considered, possibly, because of past discrimination that assumed that disabled employees would not be working. 13' Finally, even when accommodations are unique and entail significant costs,
the justification for requiring them is similar to the third justification for
prohibiting rational discrimination-the employer is the party in the best
130 Id. at 63.
131 Id.; see, e.g., Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the
AntidiscriminationProject,35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 898-920 (2004) (arguing that the reasonable

accommodation provision is very similar conceptually to our other antidiscrimination theories); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARv. L. REv. 642, 652
(2001) (arguing that other aspects of traditional anti-discrimination law, most notably the disparate impact theory, are the same as accommodation requirements).
132 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 64.
133 Id. at 65.
134 Id. at 67.
135 Id.

136 Id. at 67-68.
'37 Id. at 68.
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position to dismantle the system of subordination where accommodations
are not overly burdensome.138
Despite his argument that accommodation mandates are theoretically and normatively similar to anti-discrimination mandates, Bagenstos
further argues that we should not be satisfied with an anti-discrimination
model because it lacks the power to "attack broad-gauged inequalities."1 39 This is because anti-discrimination law is a fault-based regime
that requires employers to eliminate barriers that in some way resulted
from the employer's behavior. But, as Bagenstos claims, some barriers
for individuals with disabilities are structural and cannot be attributed to
any particular employer. The three barriers he refers to are: (1) the unavailability of personal assistance to help some individuals with disabilities get ready for work, (2) the lack of accessible transportation to work,
and (3) the discriminatory structure of our health insurance system.14 0
Bagenstos then explains how two doctrines-the "job-related" rule and
the access/content distinction-have worked to drain the accommodation
requirement of significant power to eliminate structural barriers that keep
individuals with disabilities out of the workforce.141
The job-related rule requires employers to provide only those accommodations that are job-related and not personal items. This rule limits accommodations that employers could provide at reasonable costs.1 4 2
If an accommodation could help an employee outside of her job (like
training a new service animal or transportation to allow the employee to
get to work) the employer does not have to provide it.143 The access/
content distinction also limits the reach of the reasonable accommodation
provision.144 This rule only requires an accommodation if it allows individuals with disabilities to gain access to the same benefit; it does not
require that those individuals be given the same content of the benefit.14 5
For example, a bookstore has to allow a blind person into the store (and
even the blind person's Seeing Eye dog despite a "no animal" rule) but it
would not be required to stock any Braille books or audio books that the
blind person could utilize.146 This access/content distinction has the
most significance in the insurance industry, where insurance companies
are able to get away with putting special coverage caps on certain diseases (like AIDS) by arguing that they offer people with AIDS the same
Id.
Id.
140 Id. at 69.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 70.
"43 Id.
I44 Id.
145 Id. at 71.
146 Id.
138
'39
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insurance protection as everyone else (coverage with an AIDS cap) so it
does not matter that the cap on AIDS harms individuals with HIV more
than individuals without HIV. "No accommodation is required if it
would alter the content of the opportunity the defendant offers
generally."' 4 7
Bagenstos argues that both the job-related rule and the access/content distinction operate to bring the accommodation requirement very
closely in line with the anti-discrimination requirement. If we force employers to help disabled employees to get to work or to help them with
their daily living, it seems like we are requiring employers to make up
for the disadvantage suffered by the individual with a disability. 148 This,
in turn, would lead some to view the accommodation requirement as
charity, which is what most disability advocates sought to avoid. 149 As
Bagenstos argues: "So long as courts interpreting the accommodation requirement feel compelled to focus on the fault of individual employers,
as opposed to that of society as a whole, that requirement will lack significant power to undo the deep-rooted structural barriers to employment
for people with disabilities." 15 0
Bagenstos's explanation of the limits of the anti-discrimination
model is an important contribution to the disability literature. There is so
much of an emphasis on trying to fit disability law into the anti-discrimination model. And while Bagenstos accomplishes that persuasively, he
correctly notes that anti-discrimination law cannot accomplish all that
needs accomplishing.
SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF THE CONFLICTS OF THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT

II.

In the next two chapters of the book, Bagenstos explores the general
conflicts identified earlier in two specific applications-how entities
(mostly employers) deal with safety risks and the life and death debate.
A.

Chapter 5: Disability and Safety Risks

In Chapter 5, Bagenstos discusses the fear of safety risks that leads
to a great deal of disability discrimination. Bagenstos is critical of the
paternalism against individuals with disabilities.' 5 1 One of the first debates he discusses is whether risk should be assessed using an expert,
technocratic approach, or a democratic approach that gives weight to
147 Id.

148
149
150
151

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 72.
at 73.
at 74.
at 76.
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"lay" perceptions of risk. 152 Those who are skeptical of the professional
communities might prefer a democratic approach, which gives respect to
differing value judgments about risk.153 Bagenstos disagrees with this
view, stating: "If the goal of disability rights activists is to impose a
check on the prejudices of the majority, then a regime that aims simply to
transform the majority's view into policy seems instantly problematic."1 54 He also argues that the public's fear of disease is very connected to the stigma and stereotypes that disability rights laws seek to
eliminate.1 55
But Bagenstos also recognizes that too much reliance on all professionals is also problematic. He believes the law has deferred too broadly
to professionals, but he supports some deference to professionals-specifically, to public health professionals.1 5 6 The Supreme Court has said
that the views of public health authorities "are of special weight and authority," and courts should normally defer to their reasonable medical
judgments. If public health officials say it is safe to hire someone, the
defendant cannot exclude that individual unless the defendant shows that
the judgment of those officials is "medically unsupportable."15 7
While Bagenstos recognizes that this deference is in tension with
the skepticism towards professionals, he supports the rule because of the
political balance of power in public health agencies.15 8 Bagenstos argues
that deference to public health officials is certainly better than letting
judges and juries decide these safety risk issues because they may be
particularly susceptible to prejudices that lead to discrimination, and because, when asked to view the issue just as it relates to one defendant,
judges and juries are more likely to ignore the broader effect of exclusion.159 Certainly, Bagenstos recognizes that the deference to public
health officials rule is imperfect 160 but thinks that the "deference rule
allocates authority to adjudicate disputes over risk-based discrimination
to an entity that is uniquely likely to act in a manner that furthers those
advocates' integrationist goals." 1 61
One reason for believing that public health officials will be likely to
take into account the interests of individuals with disabilities is that the
institutional culture of public health agencies is especially concerned
Id.
Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
152

at 77.

153

at 78.
at 78-79.
at 79.
158 Id. at 80.
159 Id. For instance, many early HIV cases held that any risk of transmission was significant, regardless of how small.
160 Id. at 81.
161 Id. at 82.
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with the probabilities of risk and harm-they gather enormous amounts
of data, which guards against cognitive biases. 162 Further, the fear of
driving risk underground has recently given public health officials an
interest in eliminating unjustifiable discrimination against those who are
believed to pose risks.16 3 Finally, and counter-intuitively, Bagenstos argues that the broad jurisdiction of these agencies might be helpful for
disability rights, because individuals with disabilities (especially individuals with risky disabilities) are likely to have disproportionate access to
these agencies, which will help to counter the tendency of the private
market to discriminate. 16 4
Despite favoring deference to public health authorities, Bagenstos
opposes "technocratic deference to 'expertise.'"165 Specifically, he is
against giving deference to agencies like the Federal Highway Administration (FHA), for example, whose regulations (and courts' deference to
them) has led to the exclusion of many individuals with disabilities,
many perhaps unjustly. 166 The reason for his opposition is simply because these agencies are more likely to be responsive to the concerns of
the industry, labor unions, and public interest groups, rather than to individuals with disabilities. 16 7
Bagenstos then turns his attention to the issue presented in Chevron
USA, Inc. v. Echazabal,168 whether it is unlawful to discriminate on the
basis of a fear that a person with a disability will injure himself and not
someone else. As Bagenstos discloses in the Introduction, 16 9 he argued
the case before the Supreme Court on behalf of the plaintiff, Echazabal,
so Bagenstos's interest in and criticism of this case is not surprising.170
In Chevron, the Court decided the narrow issue of whether the EEOC
had correctly interpreted the direct threat standard-an employer may
refuse to employ an individual with a disability if he poses a "direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.-to
include threat to oneself.17 1 The Court held that the EEOC had not exceeded its authority in stating that employers may refuse to employ an
individual with a disability if the disability causes the individual to pose
a direct threat to only himself. Bagenstos disagrees with the Court's decision when considered in light of the prohibition against paternalistic
162 Id.
163 Id.

164 Id. at 83.
165 Id. at 85.
166 Id.
167 Id.

at 86.
168 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
169 Id. at 3.
170 Id. at 87.
171 Id. (emphasis added).
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protection in the sex discrimination context and Congress's recognition
of paternalism as a major target of the ADA. 1 72
He states that the Chevron decision is particularly troubling to many
disability rights advocates because the "dignity of risk" is a central ideal
for many individuals with disabilities.17 3 Bagenstos explains how libertarians also believed in this idea that individuals should be free to make
safety decisions for themselves, but libertarians would take this idea so
far as to claim all workplace safety laws (like OSHA) unjust.1 74 Some
have criticized advocates who favor the position argued in Echazabal for
this reason. But as Bagenstos explains, the dignity of risk argument does
not need to follow a libertarian's position of rejecting all paternalism; it
could be seen instead as "practical egalitarianism."' 7 5 The problem is
not all paternalism; it is paternalistic discrimination-singling out and
excluding a historically disadvantaged group based on safety concerns.
This view would challenge the decision in Chevron but not challenge
general workplace safety rules that apply to everyone.' 76
B.

Chapter 6: Disability, Life, Death, and Choice

In Chapter 6, Bagenstos discusses the very controversial issues surrounding assisted suicide, non-treatment of newborns with disabilities,
and genetic testing followed by selective abortion of fetuses with disabilities.' 7 7 As Bagenstos points out, these issues reveal deep tension in the
disability rights community, with both sides of the debate claiming that
their view is espoused in principles of anti-paternalism and choice.'78 Of
course, these life and death issues in the disability context inevitably are
intertwined with the abortion debate.17 9 Bagenstos explores in some detail the intersection between disability rights and anti-abortion advocacy.
One common link between the disability movement and the anti-abortion
movement is the belief that any "choice" exercised is not a free choice
because social pressures make most choices not truly free. 8 0
Bagenstos first discusses the selective refusal to treat infants with
disabilities.s1 8 In the 1980s, cases were filed when parents agreed with a
doctor's advice to not treat fatal health conditions of babies who had
172

Id. at 88-89.

173 Id. at 90-91.
I74 Id.
175

Id.
Id. at 92.
177 Id. at 95.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 96.
180 Id. at 97.
181 Id.
176
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disabilities.18 2 The disability rights groups joined forces with anti-abortion groups to support the Reagan Administration's position that refusing
to treat infants in these circumstances violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 183 The two major arguments made by these groups (and later
used to challenge assisted suicide and prenatal testing) were: (1) the decision to withdraw treatment from an infant with a disability is often based
on an erroneous understanding of the "quality of life" of these babies,
where parents assumed that their children's lives are not worth living;
and (2) it is the biases of doctors and not the free choice of parents that
led to withholding of treatment from newborns with disabilities.18 4
The second controversial issue Bagenstos discusses is assisted suicide.18 5 Although it would seem that those who oppose paternalism

would oppose restrictions on one's ability to make the ultimate life decision to end one's life, some disability rights groups oppose assisted suicide, viewing it as threatening to the lives and interests of individuals
with disabilities.18 6 They argue that those who favor assisted suicide
falsely assume that a life with a disability is not a life worth living.' 87
These groups are also worried that if the law allows assisted suicide,
individuals would receive pressure from family and friends into exercising this right, no matter how stringently the right is regulated.18 8 This
pressure, even if well-meaning, is thought to encompass a belief that a
life with a disability is so low quality that it would be a sensible decision

to end it.189 On the other hand, disability advocates contend that "the
greatest suffering of people with disabilities is the socially stigmatized
identity inflicted upon them," rather than the physical limitations. 190
Some believe that if the suffering from prejudice was eliminated, it
would make a life with a disability as valuable as any other life.191
Others believe that the stigma of disability also influences the decision to
die-that when a person chooses to die, "they do so from the position of
a society that fears, discriminates against, and stigmatizes disability as
undignified. Facing a life of societal exclusion, prejudice, and fear, in
conjunction with self-deprecation and devaluation based on those same
irrational assumptions, is there really a choice at all?"' 92
182 Id. at 97-100.
183 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006); BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 97-100.
184 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 99.
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187
188
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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100.
100-02.
100.
100-02.
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190 Id.
191 Id.

192 Id. at 102.
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While I do not want to minimize the harm caused by social stigmatization, this view ignores the fact that many individuals with disabilities
who want to end their lives suffer from a terminable illness with unbearable pain. Ending the stigma of disability is not going to take away the
physical pain associated with some disabilities.
The conflation of the disability rights movement and the anti-abortion movement is most prevalent in the context of prenatal testing, which
is used to identify and abort fetuses that have disabilities.193 Disability
advocates object to this practice because "it is driven by misinformation," and "it reflects the view that a life with a disability is not worth
living." 194 Moreover, some are concerned that reducing the number of
individuals with disabilities will reduce their visibility, leading to even
more prejudice and fear. It is also alleged that many of these abortion
decisions are misinformed, if not coerced. 9 5 Medical professionals focus on and overemphasize the negative-costs and short life spanswhile ignoring the positive aspects of children (and adults) with disabilities.19 6 Many of these advocates do not favor more regulation of abortion: instead, they favor persuading medical professionals to include the
"positive aspects of living (and parenting a child) with a disability." 19 7
Nevertheless, the disability rights movement's influence in this area
has implications for the abortion rights debate, creating a tension between the disability rights critique and support for broad abortion
rights.198 Bagenstos discusses this topic at length.199 The convergence
can be summarized as follows: because disability rights advocates believe that private actors can limit free choice as much as the government
can (based on societal stigma of disability), regulation is necessary to
counterbalance the strong social forces against individuals with disabilities. 200 Many of the abortion cases, which permit some regulation of
abortion (designed to allow a more informed choice), are consistent with
the arguments of disability rights advocates. 2 0 1 Accordingly, even
though governmental regulation may impede choice (with waiting periods, etc.) it does so in an effort to remove greater obstacles to free choice
caused by private actors. 202 Taken to an extreme, Bagenstos points out
that one might argue that if most abortions were forced and not a wo193 Id. at 102-03.
194 Id. at 103.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 103-04.

197 Id. at
198 Id. at
199 Id. at
200 Id.
201 Id. at
202 Id.

104.
104-05.
104-11.
107-08.
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man's true choice, then autonomy may be best served by prohibiting
abortion altogether. 20 3 He does not support this position (nor do I) but he
does note how it parallels the arguments made by disability rights advocates in the assisted suicide context. 20 4 The concern in the assisted suicide context is that the pressures to end one's life will be so powerful that
many people with disabilities will be coerced into ending their lives. 205
If one believes the empirical argument that legalization of assisted suicide would lead many people to unwillingly end their lives (despite strict
regulations to prevent such coercion) then autonomy would demand
preventing assisted suicide. 206 The same argument can be and is made
regarding abortion. 20 7
There is an alternative position, according to Bagenstos. 2 08 Those
who defend assisted suicide point to statistics that the majority of individuals with disabilities support assisted suicide, a view that is consistent
with "the core disability principles of independence and anti-paternalism." 20 9 This group argues that a belief that individuals with disabilities
are incapable of making their own decision is unacceptable to a substantial majority of individuals with disabilities. 2 10 Those who take this position are not against all regulation; they would endorse regulation aimed
at ensuring that the decision is free and informed. 211 This might seem
inconsistent with the pro-choice advocates who disagree with these types
of restrictions on abortion. 212 Bagenstos points out that there are reasons
to treat assisted suicide differently than abortion, but he also notes that
disability rights advocates who support assisted suicide and abortion
might favor informed consent requirements for disability-selective
abortions. 2 13
In the end, Bagenstos astutely points out that one's position in these
debates will depend in part on one's view of the empirical question regarding how often individuals with disabilities are coerced to end their
own lives or the lives of disabled fetuses. 2 14 He also correctly notes that
the debate does not and should not apply to the non-treatment of
newborns with disabilities. 2 15 They are persons, not fetuses, and unlike
203 Id. at 111.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.

207 Id. at 110-11.
208 Id.

209 Id. at 112.
210 Id.

211 Id. at 112-13.
212 Id. at 113.
213 Id.

214 Id. at 114.
215 Id. at 114-15.
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adults who seek assisted suicide, infants have no ability to choose or
refuse treatment. 2 16 Therefore, there is no inconsistency in prohibiting
the non-treatment of newborns with disabilities while allowing assisted
suicide and disability-selective abortions. 2 17
III.

EXPLORING AND POSSIBLY SOLVING THE CHALLENGES OF THE
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT

A.

Chapter 7. The Limits of the Anti-Discrimination Model

In Chapter 7, Bagenstos begins the two-chapter discussion of his
thesis, which first describes the limitations of the anti-discrimination
model and then provides his proposal for the future of the disability
rights movement. In this chapter, he focuses on whether the anti-discrimination model is ideally suited to the goals of the disability rights movement-specifically, the goals of expanding employment for individuals
with disabilities and allowing them to live a full life in the community. 2 18
In assessing the effectiveness of the ADA on these goals, Bagenstos
takes an honest look at the statistics. 2 19 Recognizing that statistics come
in infinite varieties and there are innumerable conclusions that can be
drawn from them, Bagenstos does a good job of not overstating the
claims made by the studies. His goal is one of summarizing the statistics
rather than analyzing any study in depth; my goal is to summarize his
summary.
The evidence is mixed with respect to the goal of integrating individuals with disabilities into the community. 220 There was a slight increase in individuals with disabilities who went out to eat in restaurants
but a slight decrease in other important community activities. 221 Regarding employment, for which we have much more data, Bagenstos is more
conclusive: "the statute has failed significantly to improve the employment position of people with disabilities. Indeed, by virtually all reports
the employment rate for Americans with disabilities has declined over
the time the statute has been on the books." 222 He also notes that three
studies demonstrate that the initial implementation of the statute was associated with a significant decrease in employment for individuals with
disabilities, and this decrease could not be explained by other factors. 223
There is a simple (albeit depressing) explanation for this fact. Because
216

Id.

217 Id.
218

Id. at 116.
at 116-18.
Id. at 116.

219 Id.
220
221
222
223

Id.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 118.
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the ADA imposes accommodation costs on employers (and when first
enacted, employers feared much higher costs), employers are reluctant to
hire individuals with disabilities who may need accommodation. 224 Employers know that it is much easier for plaintiffs to prove discrimination
in a termination case (or a failure to accommodate case) than a failure to
hire case, so they have an incentive to not hire individuals with
disabilities. 225
In analyzing why the ADA has not achieved its employment goals,
Bagenstos explores the argument made by many-that the Supreme
Court's decisions have contributed to the failure of the ADA to improve
the employment rate of individuals with disabilities. 226 Although he
thinks the decisions were wrongly decided (as do I), he notes that they
have "roughly confined the statute's coverage to those individuals who
need the ADA's protections to remain in the workforce." 227 Accordingly, the decisions are not responsible for restricting the employment of
individuals with disabilities because those not covered by the ADA's
constrained definitions can likely find employment elsewhere. 2 28 His explanation of the decisions makes sense if we are primarily concerned
with the distinction between employment and unemployment. But if (as
he argues earlier in his criticism of the independence focus) 2 2 9 the
ADA's goals cannot be reached simply by securing employment for individuals with disabilities without providing full employment opportunity
for every individual with a disability, then the Supreme Court's decisions
are less defensible. 230
So why not abandon the ADA? Bagenstos gives several reasons for
keeping it. First of all, he thinks the initial negative effect on employment is a short-term phenomenon, reflecting the fact that even though
employers might have initially been reluctant to hire individuals with
disabilities because of accommodation costs, these costs will seems less
onerous when others can benefit from the same accommodations. 23 1
Bagenstos also argues that there is no reason to think that the ADA will
not have long-standing benefits. 232 It probably already has had a positive
effect on individuals with disabilities who do not require accommoda-

224 Id. atlI8-19.
225 Id. at 118.
226 Id. at 120-21.
227 Id.

Id
229 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
228

230 BAGENSTOS, supra note

231 Id. at 121-22.
232 Id. at 122.

1, at

121.
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tions and will ultimately have a positive effect on those who do need
accommodations. 233
Turning to the primary purpose of this chapter of his book, Bagenstos argues that there are two explanations for the ADA's limited success. 2 3 4 The first is the difficulty in enforcing the ADA because of
limited remedies. 235 The second is the limits of the anti-discrimination
model in achieving deep social change. 236
With regard to enforcement difficulties, Bagenstos looks at both the
problems with enforcing Title I-the ADA's public accommodation
provisions and the problem with enforcing Title I-the employment provisions. 237 The problem varies depending on which of these provisions
is at issue.
The reason the ADA's public accommodation provisions are underenforced is simple-the ADA does not allow for money damages when a
business has been found to violate the ADA's public accommodation
mandate. 2 38 And because a rational business might not voluntarily modify its premises to make them accessible, businesses have no incentive to
conform to the ADA's requirements. 239 Title III of the Act depends on
individual plaintiffs to enforce its provisions. 240 But each plaintiff has
little incentive to bring a lawsuit because they will not get any money. 24 1
Plaintiffs' attorneys do not have an incentive to bring the lawsuits because they cannot collect their fees as part of a contingency fee arrangement. 2 4 2 Even though the statute provides for attorney fees if the
plaintiff wins, the Court has made "winning" more difficult by holding
that plaintiffs can recover fees only when the litigation results in a "judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties." 24 3 Out
of court settlements and voluntary compliance do not count. Accordingly, businesses have an incentive to adopt a wait-and-see approachwait to see if they get sued, and if they do, wait to see if the plaintiff is
likely to win, and if so, voluntarily make the modification before judgment is entered. 244 It is not surprising then, that the statute's public accommodation provision is very under-enforced. 245
Id.
234 Id. at 123.
233

235 Id.
236

Id.

237 Id.
238

239
240
241
242
243

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

244 Id.
245 Id.
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at
at
at
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123-24.
125.
124.
125-26.
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The reason the employment provisions are under-enforced is because so much employment litigation focuses on termination rather than
failure to hire. 24 6 This also is a response to the incentives for plaintiffs'
lawyers. 24 7 Incumbent employees are more likely to be able to pay a
retainer; their damages will be higher, and it is easier to prove discrimination for incumbent employees than applicants. 24 8 The skew in favor of
discharge cases also has the perverse effect of causing employers to discriminate in hiring because they know if they hire individuals with disabilities and later want to fire them or fail to accommodate them, it will be
much harder for the employer to defend those lawsuits. 24 9
The second reason for the limited success of the ADA, Bagenstos
argues, is the limitation of anti-discrimination law, which focuses on individual acts of discrimination by an employer at fault for the discrimination. 250 As Bagenstos pointed out earlier, many of the most significant
challenges facing individuals with disabilities are not attributable to the
acts of employers. Some challenges are caused by the lack of personal
assistance services, the lack of assistive technology, or the lack of accessible transportation. 25 1 Bagenstos believes that the biggest problem is
the current structure of our healthcare system. 252 The problem is not that
individuals with disabilities are disproportionately uninsured. 253 The
problem is that most private health insurance fails to cover the personal
services and assistive devices needed by individuals with disabilities and
public insurance has requirements that keep individuals out of the
workforce. 254 Accordingly, anti-discrimination law is simply too narrow
of a tool to effectuate any large-scale improvement for individuals with

disabilities. 255

246 Id.
Id.
248 Id. at 127-28.
247

249 Id. It might be harder for an employer to defend a termination or failure to accommodation claim than to defend a failure to hire claim, but it is still relatively easy. Defendants
often win summary judgment motions. RuTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 118 (7th ed. 2009).
250 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 128-30.
251 Id. at 128.
252 Id. at 129.
253 Id. (citing a GAO report that found that nine percent of disabled individuals reported
being uninsured, compared with 15 percent of the non-disabled working age population).
254

Id.

Id. at 129-30 (noting that courts have construed the ADA to narrow the scope of the
ADA's accommodation requirement, thus "depriving the statute of much utility in attacking
the health insurance practices that keep so many people with disabilities out of the
workforce").
255

2011]
B.

RELIEVING (MOST OF) THE TENSION

791

Chapter 8: Future Directions in Disability Law

In the final chapter of his book, Bagenstos provides his suggestions
for moving disability rights forward toward accomplishing more of its
goals. 25 6 He advocates a two-pronged approach: improving the enforcement of the ADA and "adopting new interventions that go beyond the
ADA's anti-discrimination/accommodation model." 2 5 7
To improve enforcement of the ADA's public accommodation title
(Title III), he recommends a simple (albeit politically difficult) solution:
Congress should amend the ADA to allow for money damages for violations of Title 111.258 In response to those who complain about serial litigation 259 (individual lawyers or plaintiffs bringing hundreds of cases
against businesses without notifying them) Bagenstos believes that these
abusive litigation tactics are the direct result of limited remedies. 2 60 He
thinks the best response is to allow a damages remedy; require plaintiffs
to file pre-suit notice; and to have defendants pay attorney fees to plaintiffs who succeed in eliminating the ADA violation by providing such
pre-suit notice. 26 1
Bagenstos correctly notes that improving enforcement of the employment provisions is more difficult. 2 6 2 An obvious solution that he
rejects for political reasons would be to increase damages for failure to
hire violations. 263 His other suggestion is more feasible-the EEOC
should "devote more resources to failure to hire claims." 2 6 4 He correctly
points out that private lawyers are handling the termination claims so the
EEOC should be focusing on what private lawyers are not. The more
failure to hire cases the EEOC brings, the less of an incentive employers
will have to discriminate in the hiring stage. 265
256 Id. at 131-50.

Id. at 131.
258 Id. at 132 (noting again that "the absence of a damages remedy has deprived plaintiff's
257

lawyers of an incentive to bring ADA public accommodation suits").
259 Id. (referring to "the businesses and their political allies" who are concerned that "individual lawyers or plaintiffs [would bring] hundreds of cases each, against dozens of businesses in each town they visit, without notifying a business of the problem before filing suit").
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id. (noting that "remov[ing the caps on compensatory and punitive damages] would
require legislative action-which would likely face political hurdles similar to those faced by
the proposal to authorize a damages remedy for ADA public accommodations cases").
264 Id.
265 Id. at 133 (arguing that "[i]n the disability context, where private attorneys are bringing discharge cases that may actually create a disincentive to hire members of the protected
class, government action to bring hiring cases that would counteract that disincentive is particularly imperative").
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Bagenstos recognizes the limits of his proposal to increase enforcement of the ADA's provisions. 266 As discussed earlier, Bagenstos believes that one of the major reasons the ADA has not been more
successful is because of the limits of the anti-discrimination/accommodation model. 2 6 7 Accordingly, he argues that disability rights activists must
move beyond the anti-discrimination model and toward social welfare
interventions to achieve the goals of increased employment and integration in community life. 2 6 8 He recognizes, of course, that many of his
ideas are likely to increase the tensions within the disability movement
because of the position of some activists that "charity" or "welfare"
should be avoided at all costs. 2 6 9 But he believes that "social welfare
interventions must be [and can be] tailored to promote employment, integration, and community participation, and to avoid unnecessary paternalism and dependence." 270
His major proposal is to expand public health insurance in several
ways. First, Bagenstos discusses the benefits and limitations of enforcing the Medicaid Act. 2 7 1 While many lawsuits have been filed and won
under this Act,2 72 the states have wide discretion to implement benefits
how they please, and the structure of the Act has a strong bias toward
institutional rather than community placements. 2 73
Second, Bagenstos discusses expanding eligibility for public health
insurance. 274 Currently, Medicare and Medicaid have powerful disincentives to work, and yet private insurance does not provide for the kinds of
services that individuals with disabilities often need (personal assistance
and assistive technology, for instance). 275 This leaves individuals with
disabilities in a horrible catch-22. He notes that the Ticket to Work &
Work Incentives Improvement Act (TWWIIA) of 1999276 has made
some effort to sever the link between working and being cut-off from all
healthcare benefits, but this Act does not go far enough. 277
266 Id. at 136.
267 Id. at 128.
268 Id. at 136.
270

Id.
Id.

271
272
273
274

Id. at 138-40.
Id at 138.
Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 140.

269

Id.
276 The Ticket to Work & Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320b-19 (2006).
277 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 141 (noting that the Act fails to help those whose "attachment to the workforce is shaky," and that the Act's extension of Medicare benefits "may
not be sufficient to eliminate disincentives to work").
275
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Third, Bagenstos argues for expanding the services covered by public health insurance. 27 8 One attempt has been the Community Choice
Act, 279 which would eliminate Medicaid's institutional bias "by mandating that states cover personal assistance services" and allowing individuals with disabilities to decide where to receive these services and to have
the power to "hire, fire and manage their assistants." 2 8 0
Despite his advocacy for these social welfare initiatives, Bagenstos
acknowledges the dilemmas that emerge with these attempts. 2 81 First, as
a general matter, he recognizes that there is a strong critique of the social
welfare system. 282 More specifically, he addresses the debate between
universal and targeted approaches. 2 8 3 Briefly stated, targeted programs
are more efficient at alleviating the suffering of individuals with disabilities, 284 but universal programs "are generally thought to be more politically stable." 2 8 5 As a simple example, he notes the increased acceptance
of social security, which benefits everyone, over means-tested welfare

programs. 2 86
While recognizing that disability-specific reform will not be as criticized as a program targeted to poor people because individuals with disabilities are considered the "deserving poor," programs that foster the
attitude that individuals with disabilities are in need of charity conflict
with the movement's emphasis on disabled individuals being considered
full and equal citizens. 28 7 Therefore, Bagenstos argues, disability rights
activists should seek to achieve their social welfare goals through "universal policies that recognize that the entire population is at risk for the
concomitants of chronic illness and disability." 288
Accordingly, Bagenstos urges the adoption of a universal healthcare
system. 2 8 9 Such a guarantee would eliminate the fear of loss of coverage
when becoming employed and the universal nature of the program
"would not send the message that people with disabilities are uniquely in
need of caretaking; it would send the message that we all need insurance
against contingencies in life." 2 9 0 I have made similar arguments else278 Id.

279 S. 683, 111 th Cong. (2009).
280 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 140-41.
281 Id. at 142-48.

282 Id. at 143.
283 Id. at 143-45.
284 Id. at 143.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 143-44.
287 Id. at 144.
288 Id. (quoting Irving Kenneth Zola, Toward a Necessary Universalizing of a Disability
Policy, 67 MLBANK Q. 401, 401 (1989)).
289 Id. at 144-45.
290 Id. at 145.
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where 29 1 in an attempt to justify providing some benefits that would help
parents and other caregivers to balance work and family. Because anyone can find themselves forced into a caregiver role at any time (either
through unintended pregnancy or when a parent or other loved one suddenly becomes sick or disabled and needs care), flexibility benefits can
be seen as ultimately benefiting everyone because anyone could find
himself needing the flexibility. 292
The second tension Bagenstos discuses is one over consumer control. 29 3 The concern is that an emphasis on increased "medical" services
for individuals with disabilities will collide with the "anti-paternalist project" of disability rights activists. 294 He uses the Community Choice Act
to highlight the tension. 295 Even though the Act would give individuals
with disabilities control over the personal assistance services provided to
them, recipients of those services would be forced to rely on home health
agencies to deliver these services, which limits the autonomy of individuals with disabilities. 296 Accordingly, Bagenstos proposes a voucher
system in which individuals with disabilities serve as employers for their
aids and receive a fixed amount of money to pay for their wages. 297 Of
course, he also recognizes the drawback of such a system-many do not
want to employ their own attendants and the employment effects on
those attendants might be negative. 29 8 Therefore, a "more promising approach would retain an agency-provider model of service delivery but
give people with disabilities a greater voice in the operations of the provider agencies." 299
In conclusion, while he recognizes that his discussion in this chapter
was "quite wonkish," 30 0 he believes the goals of employment and community integration are best achieved through a combination of the ADA
(with increased enforcement) and social welfare programs. 30 1 He states:
"What the movement needs is a renewed emphasis on the approaches
that have been eclipsed: approaches that look to universalism as a key
291 Nicole B. Porter, Why Care About Caregiving? Using Communitarian Theory to Justify Protection of "Real" Workers, 58 U. KANSAS L. REv. 355 (2010) [hereinafter Porter,
Caregiving].
292 Id. at 399-400.
293 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 145-48.
294 Id. at 146.
295 Id.
296 Id.

297 Id. at 147.
298 Id. at 147-48.
299 Id. at 148.
300 Id.

301 Id. at 149-50.
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element of disability policy, and that embrace social welfare programs as
important tools for achieving disability equality."3 0 2
I agree with Bagenstos that the anti-discrimination model cannot
accomplish all of the work of increasing employment and integrating individuals with disabilities into the community. I also think his proposals
are good ones. As I will discuss below, I think a universal approach that
avoids the stigma of disability-specific reform is important. 303 My primary critique of Bagenstos's ideas is that he focuses mostly on the severely disabled-those who either cannot get hired or whose mobility or
other restrictions make it difficult for them to be integrated into the community. Yet, there are many individuals who are moderately disabled
and still experience discrimination by their employers and possibly other
entities, as well.

IV.

THE UN-RELIEVED TENSION: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR NON-DISABLED
CO-WORKERS

Bagenstos does a great job of exploring many of the conflicts and
contradictions in the disability rights movement. But the one conflict he
does not address is the one that will be very significant in upcoming
years-the conflict that arises when accommodating individuals with
disabilities affects their non-disabled co-workers. I explore this conflict
now.
A. The Effect of the Amendments on the Reasonable Accommodation
Provision
The ADA Amendments Act of 200834 will make it much easier for
individuals to prove that they meet the definition of disability and therefore fall under the protection of the Act. Accordingly, more cases will
have the substantive issues decided, and many of these cases will involve
the issue of whether an employer failed to provide the employee with a
reasonable accommodation.
There were several changes in the Amendments that will make it
easier for plaintiffs to sue under the ADA. First, the Amendments make
clear that courts should not use "demanding standard[s]" when deciding
whether an individual is disabled under the Act. 30 5 One of the rules of
construction states that "the definition of disability shall be construed in
favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act, to the maximum
302

Id. at 149.

303 Infra notes 365-70 and accompanying text.
304 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 22 Stat. 3553 (2009) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (2006)).
305 ADA Amendments Act § 2(b)(4); Long, Introducing, supra note 5, at 218.
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extent permitted by the terms of this Act." 30 6 Second, the Amendments
make it much easier to prove that an impairment "substantially limits" a

major life activity, 307 and the amendments also expand the list of major
life activities. 308 Finally, the Amendments state that when determining
whether someone is disabled, a court should not consider any mitigating
measures (e.g., medication assistive devices) that help ameliorate the
symptoms of the impairment. 3 0
All of these changes will make it easier for individuals to prove that
they have a disability. 310 In the employment context, once an individual
can prove that he has a disability, he must also prove that he is qualified
for the position at issue, which means that he can perform the essential
functions of the position "with or without reasonable accommodation."3 11 In many cases, an individual with a disability might ask for a
reasonable accommodation to make it easier or more comfortable for her
to perform the essential functions of her job. Accordingly, courts will
have to determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation. Because more individuals will qualify as having disabilities, "more cases in
the future will turn on the question of whether the plaintiffs requested
accommodation was reasonable." 3 12
Several scholars (including myself) have hypothesized that one of
the reasons that courts interpreted the definition of disability so narrowly
(prior to the Amendments) was to avoid the difficult factual issue of determining what constitutes a reasonable accommodation. 3 13 One of the
most difficult of those accommodation issues is how to handle the situation where an individual's needed accommodation interferes with the
rights or interests of other non-disabled employees in the workplace. I
turn to that next.
B.

The Conflict: Individuals with Disabilities vs. Their Non-disabled
Co-workers

The ADA requires that employers provide individuals with disabilities reasonable accommodations to allow them to perform the essential
functions of the position at issue unless the accommodation causes an
306 ADA Amendments Act
307 Id. §§ 2(b)(5), § 4(a).

§ 4(a).

308 ADA Amendments Act § 4(a); Long, Introducing, supra note 5, at 219-22.
309 ADA Amendments Act § 4(a); Long, Introducing, supra note 5, at 219-20.
310 Long, Introducing, supra note 5, at 228 (arguing that "[b]y amending the ADA's definition of disability, Congress has assured that more individuals will qualify as having
disabilities").
311 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also Long, Introducing, supra note 5, at 228.
312 Long, Introducing, supra note 5, at 228.
313 See, e.g., id. at 227.
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undue hardship to the employer. 3 14 There are many questions that arise
with regard to what is "reasonable,"3 15 but the most difficult issue arises
when accommodations have an effect on other employees. 3 16 As I have
argued elsewhere, most (if not all) accommodations affect other employees-they just affect these co-employees to differing degrees.3 17 Even
accommodations that would seem to only affect the employer (such as
giving an employee modified office furniture or assistive devices) affect
non-disabled co-workers indirectly because money spent on accommodations is money not spent on other benefits that could be given to other
employees.3 18 And it is easy to see how modifications to a disabled employee's schedule can affect the non-disabled co-workers because employers might require those co-workers to fill in for the absent employee
with a disability.3 19
The most notable conflict and the most notable reasonable accommodation case (as the only one decided by the Supreme Court) is the
conflict that arose between an employee with a disability and more senior employees who bid on the position sought by the disabled employee
to accommodate his disability. 3 2 0 In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the
plaintiff needed a transfer 32 1 to the mailroom position because it was the
only position he could perform with his back disability. 322 But because
other employees who had more seniority than Barnett also bid on the
physically less demanding position, the employer refused to accommodate Barnett by allowing him to have the mailroom position, and he was
fired. 32 3 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court resolved
the conflict in favor of the non-disabled employees by stating that it is
not "ordinarily" reasonable for an individual accommodation to trump a
seniority system. 324 The Court seemed to be basing its decision in large
314 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2010).
315 Some of the undecided issues include whether an employer has to allow an employee
to work from home and whether an employer has to give an employee a leave of absence to
heal from a surgery or otherwise deal with the employee's medical condition.
316 See Long, Introducing, supra note 5, at 227; Nicole B. Porter, Reasonable Burdens:
Resolving the Conflict Between Disabled Employees and Their Coworkers, 34 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 313 (2007) [hereinafter Porter, Reasonable Burdens].
317 Porter, Reasonable Burdens, supra note 316, at 319.
318 Id. at 333 n.126.
319 Id. at 319.

320 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
321 Id. at 394. Transfer always strikes me as the wrong word, because Barnett was technically already in the mailroom position when the company decided to open the position up to
seniority bidding pursuant to its unilaterally-imposed, non-contractually binding seniority system. Even though the issue is framed as one of "reassignment to a vacant position," it can
more accurately be described as maintenance of the status quo. Id. at 423.
322 Id. at 394.
323 Id.
324 Id.

at 406. The Court did allow an exception to its general rule if the plaintiff can
show "special circumstances" warranting a departure from the seniority system. Id.
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part on the co-employees' legitimate expectations of fair and uniform
treatment under a seniority system,32 5 but some commentators have argued that the Court's opinion in Barnett could be read more broadly, as
an assault on any accommodation when it has significant effects on nondisabled co-workers.32 6
I predicted that this broader reading of Barnett would come to fruition when the Court granted certiorari in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. 3 2 7 The issue in the Huber case was whether an employer had to
accommodate a qualified, disabled employee by transferring her to a vacant position when there were other more qualified applicants for the
position. 328 In resolving this conflict, the Eighth Circuit held that the
employer's best-qualified policy trumps its obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. 329 The court was influenced by
the rule and the reasoning from the Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.,330 which held that to give the position to the employee
with the disability over more qualified applicants would "convert a nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference statute, a result which
would be both inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA
and an unreasonable imposition on the employers and coworkers of disabled employees." 331
This result has not been unanimous among the circuits. Other
courts have found that, as long as an employee with a disability is qualified for a vacant position to which he seeks to transfer because he can no
longer perform the essential functions of his current position, the employer is obligated to provide the accommodation. 3 32 The court in Smith
v. Midland Brake, Inc. stated:
[I]f the reassignment language merely requires employers to consider on an equal basis with all other applicants
an otherwise qualified existing employee with a disability for reassignment to a vacant position, that language
would add nothing to the obligation not to discriminate,
and would thereby be redundant . .

.33

325 Id. at 404-06.
326 See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson, "Neutral" Employer Policies and the ADA: The Implications of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 35-36
(2002); Porter, Reasonable Burdens, supra note 316, at 324-35.
327 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. granted in part, 552 U.S. 1074 (2007), cert. dis-

missed, 552 U.S. 1136 (2008).
328 Id. at 481.
329 Id. at 483.

330 227 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 2000).
331 Huber, 486 F.3d at 483 (quoting Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1028).

332 See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
333 Id.
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Accordingly, in the Tenth Circuit, the reassignment obligation requires
an employer to automatically award a position to a qualified disabled
employee even if there are other, more qualified applicants for the position.334 Because of this circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Huber but then dismissed it when the parties settled.
Arguably, the reassignment issue is one of the most difficult issues,
because if other employees seek the same job that the disabled employee
needs to accommodate his disability, there are significant consequences
to those non-disabled workers if the accommodation is given to the employee with the disability. But these reassignment cases are not the only
cases where courts express concern for the rights and interests of other
employees. In several cases, courts have held that an accommodation
that requires other employees to have to work longer or harder or simply
different hours is not mandated. For instance, in Rehrs v. Iams Co.,3 35
the court held that allowing the plaintiff to work a straight day-shift
schedule rather than a rotating shift schedule to accommodate his diabetes was unreasonable because it would place a heavier or unfavorable
burden on other employees, requiring them to work the undesirable night
shift more frequently. 336 Similarly, in Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corpo33 7
the court held that moving the plaintiff to a straight day shift to
ration,'
help him control his diabetes would place a heavier burden on the rest of
the employees and is therefore not required under the ADA. 3 3 8 Finally,
in Milton v. Scrivner, Inc.,339 the court held that an employer is not required to reallocate job duties (by giving the plaintiffs lighter loads to
move) because an "accommodation that would result in other employees
having to work harder or longer hours is not required." 340
It is at least plausible that this concern for the rights and interests of
other employees could all but obliterate the reasonable accommodation
obligation. In other words, if (as I have argued above 34 1 and elsewhere 3 4 2 ) all reasonable accommodations affect other employees, where
334 Id. There is at least an argument to be made that the D.C. Circuit would reach a
similar conclusion. In Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
the court rejected an "interpretation of the reassignment provision as mandating nothing more
than the employer allow the disabled employee to submit his application along with all of the
other candidates." Id. at 1305.
335 486 F.3d 353 (8th Cir. 2007).
336 Id. at 357.
337 101 F.3d 1090 (5th Cir. 1996).
338 Id. at 1094.

339 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995).
340 Id. at 1125 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (stating that impact on other employees
is a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of an accommodation)).
341 Supra notes 316-18 and accompanying text.
342 Porter, Reasonable Burdens, supra note 316, at 319, 333.
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do we draw the line between those accommodations that are reasonable

and those that are not?
C.

Resolving the Conflict: Bringing Independence and Community
Together

As stated above, because the ADA Amendments will make it easier
for plaintiffs to establish that they are individuals with disabilities, more
cases will turn on whether the employer provided an appropriate accommodation. Some of the most difficult accommodation issues will turn on
resolving the conflict between individuals with disabilities and their nondisabled co-workers. This subpart explores this conflict and explains
how some of the arguments made by Bagenstos, infused with a communitarian perspective, can help relieve the tension of this conflict.
Many accommodations can have consequences on non-disabled employees, and those consequences can vary in their significance, from
fairly minor (e.g., non-disabled secretary has to distribute mail more
often because the secretary using a wheelchair cannot reach many of the
slots) to more significant (e.g., non-disabled co-worker has to rotate
through an undesirable shift more often because a disabled employee
needs to work a straight shift) to the most significant (e.g., more senior
non-disabled employee is denied a transfer to a coveted position because
an employee with a disability needs the position to accommodate the
employee's disability). 343 Where do we draw the line between permissible accommodations and impermissible accommodations when all accommodations affect other employees? Professor Alex Long has
suggested that we draw the line at the point where an accommodation has
a "materially adverse impact" on other non-disabled employees. 344
Drawing from the well-known test in the retaliation context, Long proposed the following rule: "[A] proposed accommodation is not reasonable when it would violate the contractual rights of another employee or
otherwise result in an adverse employment action" for the non-disabled
employee."3 45
However, as I have argued elsewhere, the consequence of accommodations that have a materially adverse impact on other employees still
pale in comparison to the consequence to the employee with the disability if the employer does not provide the employee the necessary accommodation. 346 What was troubling about the Barnett decision is that
Barnett lost his job because the employer gave the mailroom position to
343 Porter, Reasonable Burdens, supra note 316, at 319.
344 Alex B. Long, The ADA's Reasonable Accommodation Requirement and "Innocent

Third Parties," 68 Mo. L. REv. 863, 898 (2003).
345 Id. at 901.
346 Porter, Reasonable Burdens, supra note 316, at 335.
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someone with more seniority. If the other employees did not get the
mailroom position, they would still have been employed and would have
been free to bid on other jobs as they became available. 347 When comparing the consequences to the two groups of employees-disabled employees who would lose their job without an accommodation and nondisabled employees who would remain employed and would have the
opportunity to bid on other positions in the future-it is easy to see that
strictly from an empathetic perspective, the employee with a disability
should get the accommodation to be able to remain employed. 3 4 8
But many people do not see the workplace as the appropriate locus
of compassion or empathy. Most people see the workplace as an institution that should be based on merit or other forms of objective and fair
procedures, such as seniority systems. Accordingly, we need some justification for advocating for a result that contravenes what many people
would think is the proper result in the workplace. We find this justification in the goals of the disability rights movement, infused with a communitarian influence.
One goal (or project, as Bagenstos refers to it) of the disability
rights movement is to increase the independence of individuals with disabilities. 349 As stated by Bagenstos, all people with disabilities agree that
they do not want charity, pity, or handouts, but they do want the opportunity to live in the community and work for a living.350 Bagenstos recognizes that this goal (one of independence) is in some conflict with the
requirements of the ADA, which many see as a form of "governmentmandated largesse." 35 1 Yet one way that disability rights activists were
able to achieve the passage of the ADA was to use the "independence
frame" to obtain the support from political leaders and the public. 3 5 2 As
Bagenstos states:
[T]he value of the independence frame to disability
rights advocates should be obvious. To achieve their
goals, disability rights leaders could almost endorse the
wave of fiscal conservatism and opposition to welfare
programs. They could say that people with disabilities
do not want to be dependent on disability benefits; they
"simply want to work." 3 5 3
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 13-16, 22-28.
350 Id. at 23.
351 Id.

352 Id. at 27.
353 Id. at 29.
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Bagenstos argues that the independence focus was so strong that
even the Supreme Court was influenced by the goal of independence
when it decided some of the decisions that many have criticized. 354 He
argues that if the ADA is seen as a way of saving society money by
getting people with disabilities off public benefits and into the
workforce, then the Court's restrictive definition of "disability" in the
statute makes sense. In other words, the Court wanted to keep the definition of disability narrow to only cover those individuals who would not
be employed if not for the protections of the ADA. 35 5 While I have my
doubts about whether the Court was motivated by this goal,3 56 and
Bagenstos and others have criticized whether this should have been the
Court's goal,3 57 the independence goal can be useful here to resolve
the conflict between disabled employees and their non-disabled
coworkers.358
If one goal of the disability rights movement is to increase the independence of individuals with disabilities, and if that includes increasing
the employability of disabled individuals, then we should support efforts
to employ and to keep employed individuals with disabilities. Accordingly, if an employee needs an accommodation, and without it, the employee would lose his job, then in order to further the independence goal
of the ADA, the accommodation should be given even if it causes some
burdens on other employees. If the disabled employee loses his job, it
might be very difficult for him to get another job, which could lead him
to have to rely on public benefits. Because one goal of the disability
movement is to decrease the reliance on public support, then allowing
accommodations even when they affect other employees should also be a
goal.
Especially when one considers that some accommodations are denied when they place relatively minor burdens on other employees, 359 it
defies logic to have a rule that would lead to the termination of a perfectly capable employee with a disability, possibly causing him to rely on
354 Id. at 39-41.

355 Id. (stating that cases that narrow ADA coverage "can be read as drawing a very
similar line between those who could find work without the ADA and those who need ADA
protection to avoid dependence on disability benefits programs").
356 See generally supra Part IV.A (hypothesizing that courts have used such a narrow
definition of "disability" in order to evade difficult factual issues).
357 BAGENSTos, supra note 1, at 40-41.

358 To be clear, independence cannot be the only goal of the ADA. As stated earlier,
supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text, the goal of the ADA was (and should be) equal
opportunity for all individuals with disabilities and not merely increasing the employment
opportunities of the most severely disabled.
359 For instance, I am referring here to the cases where an employer denies an employee's
request for a straight shift because the rest of the employees would have to rotate through the
less desirable shift more often. See supra notes 335-340 and accompanying text.
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government support, rather than placing relatively minor burdens on
other employees. Even when the burdens on other employees cannot
fairly be characterized as minor, the goal of independence still favors
giving the accommodation. If, without the accommodation, the individual with a disability would be unemployed, then the accommodation
should be given to the disabled employee in order to keep him employed,
rather than having the disabled employee become dependent on public
assistance. Put another way, our accommodation rules should favor
the independence of individuals with disabilities, rather than their
dependence.
For those who, despite the important goal of independence for individuals with disabilities, still quarrel with the idea of placing any burdens
on the non-disabled co-workers when accommodating an individual with
a disability, we can find additional justification for my approach to reasonable accommodations by turning to communitarian theory.
Communitarians emphasize the value of community over individual
rights. 360 It is easy to see that the community as a whole (both a particular workplace and society, in general) is better off when individuals with
disabilities remain employed, rather than having to rely on governmentfunded support. Employers and their workplaces benefit by not losing a
valuable employee and society benefits by not having to pay for the support of the individual with the disability. Yet many current approaches
to reasonable accommodation issues under the ADA emphasize the individual rights of the non-disabled co-workers over the benefit to the community if individuals with disabilities are accommodated and allowed to
remain in the workplace.3 6 1 Two primary arguments reveal the error in
that approach.
First, it is inefficient to allow the interests of non-disabled co-workers to trump the disabled employee's need for an accommodation. Accommodations that place burdens on other employees (especially minor
burdens) are often much more efficient to the workplace as a whole than
the alternative that does not involve placing reasonable burdens on other
employees. 362 For instance, it is more efficient to ask non-disabled coworkers to perform certain tasks that the disabled employee cannot perform than it is to fire the employee with the disability and have to hire
someone new. And these reasonable burdens are more efficient than asking the employer to bear the burden of not having the task accomplished
in a timely fashion. A good example of this efficiency argument is the
example of rotating shifts. Many individuals with disabilities find it dif360 Porter, Caregiving, supra note 291, at 395 (citing sources discussing communitarian
theory's emphasis on community over individual rights).
361 See supra Part IV.B.
362 Porter, Reasonable Burdens, supra note 316, at 359.
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ficult to work rotating shifts, including individuals whose disabilities
make it difficult or impossible to work at night, and individuals whose
medical care requires constant hours. If the employer does not accommodate the disabled individual by allowing her to work a straight shift
and making other employees rotate through the other shifts more frequently, the employer has two inefficient choices. It can (and often does)
fire the disabled employee and pay the price of having to hire and train a
new employee, or it can allow itself to be short-staffed on some shifts
and over-staffed on others. Either alternative is inefficient to the
workplace.363
In his book, Bagenstos argues that the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations is very similar to the obligation to avoid discriminating when such discrimination might be considered rational. 364 One of
the justifications he gives for prohibiting rational discrimination is because an "employer who has the power to work against the underlying
problem of cumulative disadvantage, even if it involves sacrifice, bears
some degree of responsibility," especially when holding the employer
responsible is not likely to cause an unreasonable burden. 365 Similarly,
the rationale for requiring accommodations is that the employer is the
party in the best position to dismantle the system of subordination when
accommodations are not overly costly. 3 6 6
In certain cases, however, the employer is not in the best position to
dismantle the subordination-at least not alone. In some cases, some of
the burden must be placed on other employees. Because the communitarian theory places an emphasis on working together to reach a common
goal, it helps support the objective here, to keep individuals with disabilities employed even when needed accommodations cause comparatively
minor burdens to other employees. The employer is still in the best position to end the subordination against individuals with disabilities, but in
order to achieve an efficient result, it should place some of those burdens
on other employees.
There is a second reason why courts are in error when they favor
non-disabled co-workers over individuals with disabilities who need reasonable accommodations to remain in the workplace. This argument is
complex and will take some unpacking. To state it simply: The proposal
here-to require accommodations that allow a disabled employee to remain employed, even when those accommodations affect other employees-can be viewed as a universal reform rather than a disability-specific
reform. As Bagenstos argues, universal programs are much more politi363
364
365
366

Id. at 359-60.
BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 62-68.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 67-68.
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cally stable because they avoid the stigma attached to disability-specific
programs, which are often seen as charity. 367
In order to make this argument, we must proceed through several
steps. First of all, we must recognize that the ADA, through the Amendments, has already become more of a "universal" statute and less of a
disability-specific mandate. This is so because the Amendments make
falling under the coverage of the ADA much easier, even for individuals
with no apparent limitations. 368 Of course, one must still meet the definition of an "individual with a disability" in order to receive accommodations under the statute and even though the Amendments put the ADA
closer on the spectrum to a universal program than it was before the
Amendments, it still may fairly be considered a disability-specific
statute.
Secondly, we must recognize that we all exist along a spectrum of
abilities, 3 6 9 and (perhaps more importantly) the entire population is at
risk for "the concomitants of chronic illness and disability."37 0 Because
we are all at risk for finding ourselves moving along the spectrum from
able-bodied towards more disabled, we should be willing to support programs that might eventually help us remain employed if we need accommodations, even when those accommodations affect other employees.
As the number of individuals with disabilities increases because of the
broadened statutory coverage, an employee could find himself both the
non-disabled co-worker who must take on some of the burden for a disabled co-worker's accommodation and at the same time, a disabled employee who needs an accommodation to remain employed, hence placing
some burdens on other employees.37 1 In this way, the burdens placed on
non-disabled co-workers are really no different than the community sup367 Id. at 144-45.

368 See supra notes 304-10 and accompanying text. As one example, consider someone
with the relapsing-remitting form of multiple sclerosis. This person might have very, very
infrequent limitations (maybe once per year or less, they have numbness, partial paralysis,
partial blindness in one eye, etc. that lasts for a couple of weeks). Yet through a couple of new
provisions in the Amendments, this person would likely be considered an individual with a
disability.
369 Feldblum et al., supra note 5, at 228.
370 BAGENSTOS, supra note 1, at 144.

371 Consider this example: John has a night vision disability, which precludes him from
working the night shift. Because the employer follows my proposal and accommodates his
disability, other employees (including co-worker Jim) have to rotate through the night shift
more often. One day Jim is in a car accident which causes a serious back disability, making
him no longer able to perform the physically demanding packing position on the plant floor.
Accordingly, he requests reassignment to a less-demanding, vacant position doing light maintenance work. John also applies for this vacant job, and even though he has been there longer
and is arguably more qualified than Jim, the employer (again following this proposal) gives the
job to Jim to allow Jim to remain employed. In this example, John and Jim have both been the
beneficiaries of my community-based rule and both have had to bear some of the burdens. In
the tried and true clich6, "what goes around comes around."
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port co-workers have given to each other for years. We help others in
our communities because we care about them but we also know that the
members of our communities will be there to help us if and when we find
ourselves in need.
The final step in viewing my resolution of the conflict between disabled employees and their co-workers as a "universal" program is the
recognition that there are limits to the burdens employers can place on
non-disabled employees. As I have suggested elsewhere, employers
should not accommodate an employee with a disability by providing an
accommodation if that accommodation would cause the termination of
another employee, or would cause another employee to be bumped from
his position.372 Arguably then, this provision actually does benefit all
employees. Without it, an employer would be free (absent contractual
obligations to the contrary-namely collective bargaining agreements in
the declining union sector) to terminate a non-disabled employee in order
to accommodate a disabled employee who needs a transfer to a position
held by someone else. I do not suggest that it would be a common scenario for an employer to do such a thing. However, as employers become
more risk-averse to litigation, it might be a rational decision to fire a nondisabled employee who likely has no statutory or contractual grounds
upon which to sue rather than risk the ADA suit if the employer does not
accommodate the employee with the disability. Because my provision
would prohibit such a result, it can be viewed as benefitting everyone,
just as universal programs should.
CONCLUSION

Bagenstos's book does an excellent job resolving many of the contradictions inherent in the disability rights movement and the law that the
movement helped to create. In the end, he is willing to discuss solutions
that most disability rights advocates avoid because of the contradictions
created by such solutions. In addressing the one conflict not addressed
by Bagenstos, I have also attempted to propose a solution that might
cause tension between individuals with disabilities and their non-disabled
co-workers. But hopefully, bringing the goals of independence and universal programs together with the communitarian theory helps create a
solution to this conflict that will relieve this tension, just as Bagenstos
has relieved many of the other tensions in the disability rights movement.

372 Porter, Reasonable Burdens, supra note 316, at 335-41.

